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Various proposals have been raised with respect to a desirable 
framework of monetary policy under the zero interest rate in Japan.
By taking due account of such proposals, this paper intends to 
examine monetary policy options under the environment of the zero
interest rate. In so doing, we first describe the policy framework of
the “zero interest rate policy,” which was in place from February
1999 to August 2000, and its transmission mechanism. Then, in
view of the problems intrinsic to the zero interest rate, we address
three important questions: (1) the policy options that might be 
available in response to future economic developments; (2) the major
risks associated with these policy options; and (3) how such risks
might change under varying economic conditions. On this basis, we
finally consider the medium- and long-term “style” of monetary 
policy in Japan in order to improve its effectiveness and efficiency. 
Key words: Zero interest rate policy; Quantitative easing; Open
market operation of outright purchase of long-term
government bonds; Dispelling deflationary concern;
Styles of monetary policy managementI. Introduction
The primary objective of monetary policy conducted by the Bank of Japan (BOJ) is
to maintain price stability, thereby contributing to the sound development of the
national economy. This mandate is clearly and indisputably defined in the Bank of
Japan Law.
1 However, when it comes to the implementation of monetary policy,
there seems to be a considerable divergence of views. 
This paper attempts to analyze various options under zero interest rate policy
from the standpoint of the monetary authorities. The key element in this analysis 
is how to weigh probable benefits against potential risks, both of which could be 
generated by these policy options. Judgment on this point can vary markedly,
depending on actual economic conditions.
2
Since the BOJ decided to terminate the zero interest rate policy on August 11,
2000, one may wonder why we need to look back on this episode from the past in
detail. First of all, additional monetary easing under the zero interest rate policy is in
itself a theoretically intriguing problem. In addition, there is the possibility that some
external shocks might occur and necessitate the exploration of further monetary 
easing beyond the zero interest rate policy in the future. Assuming that the BOJ 
cannot entirely rule out this downside possibility and given that it is pursuing
unprecedented monetary policy within the zero interest rate framework, it is 
worthwhile to thoroughly consider the costs and benefits of additional easing. 
A major contribution of this paper to the literature on the zero interest rate 
policy is to provide some numerical examples regarding the potential capital losses
that the central bank could incur if it conducts aggressive operations of outright 
purchase of long-term government bonds under the zero interest rate policy. We 
hope that our estimates could give readers a quantitative benchmark of the future 
fiscal consequence. 
Many economists have argued that the losses from central bank operations must
be added to the national budget, therefore the cost-benefit analysis from the view-
point of the central bank does not capture the social cost of quantitative easing.
However, in our opinion, such a view does not deny the importance of our numerical
examples. Rather, the examples convince readers of the importance of understanding
future fiscal consequences of quantitative easing under the zero interest rate, which
seems to be ignored by many economists except Goodfriend (2000). The examples
clearly show that it could be a mistake to investigate monetary policy under the zero
interest rate independent of fiscal policy, and that the fiscal authority might need to
assist the central bank. 
This paper is structured as follows. Chapter II describes the basic features of the
zero interest rate policy, and Chapter III summarizes recent discussions on additional
monetary easing under the zero interest rate. Chapters IV, V, and VI focus on the
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1. Article 2 of the Bank of Japan Law stipulates that “Currency and monetary control shall be aimed at, through the
pursuit of price stability, contributing to the sound development of the national economy.” 
2. Okina (1999a, 1999b) also discusses the policy options for the BOJ under the zero interest rate policy based on the
following two criteria: (1) the BOJ will take measures necessary to achieve the sound development of the national
economy through the pursuit of price stability in the long run; however, (2) the BOJ will not take such measures if
the side effects are deemed greater than the effects, which makes it difficult to achieve the objective in (1).outright purchase of long-term government bonds, which quite a few Japanese 
economists have been advocating as an effective countermeasure, should economic
conditions worsen again under the zero interest rate. Chapter VII stresses the 
importance of establishing modalities for effective monetary policy, and Chapter VIII
concludes.
Needless to say, monetary policy in Japan is decided by a majority vote at
Monetary Policy Meetings.
3 This paper does not aim to elaborate on such official or
formal views, but rather present some personal thoughts on the management of 
monetary policy under the zero interest rate. Thus, it should be noted that what is
expressed in this paper does not necessarily represent the official stance of the BOJ. 
II. Conduct of Zero Interest Rate Policy
In the following, we review the characteristics of the zero interest rate policy pursued
by the BOJ from February 1999 to August 2000.
A. Development of Zero Interest Rate Policy
In February 1999, the BOJ adopted the so-called zero interest rate policy to “flexibly
provide ample funds and encourage the uncollateralized overnight call rate to move
as low as possible,”
4 in order to avoid possible intensification of deflationary pressure
and to ensure that the economic downturn would come to a halt.
5 Subsequently, in
April 1999, the BOJ declared that it was committed to a zero interest rate policy
“until deflationary concerns are dispelled.”
6 This policy was intended to work on
market expectations so as to stabilize interest rates ranging from overnight to term
rates at a low level. Under this policy, the uncollateralized overnight call rate, which is
a direct operational target rate of the BOJ, was stable at around virtually zero percent
from April 1999 to August 2000 (Figure 1). 
On August 11, 2000, the BOJ determined to terminate the zero interest rate 
policy to “encourage the uncollateralized overnight call rate to move on average
around 0.25%.” The Bank explained this policy action in the statement on “Change
of the Guideline for Money Market Operations” as follows. 
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3. Information regarding the Monetary Policy Meeting of the BOJ, such as Announcement of the Monetary Policy
Meeting Decisions, Monthly Report of Recent Economic and Financial Developments, and Minutes of the
Monetary Policy Meeting, is available both in Japanese and English at the same time from the BOJ’s website
(http://www.boj.or.jp).
4. During the early phase of the zero interest rate policy until the Monetary Policy Meeting on September 21, 1999,
the policy directive for the intermeeting period contained an additional remark: “The Bank of Japan will provide
ample funds if judged necessary to maintain stability of the financial markets.” However, at the meeting on
October 13, 1999, this remark was regarded as unnecessary given market conditions at the time and was deleted.
In addition, at the same meeting, the wording of the directive was also revised to more explicitly convey the 
content and aim of the zero interest rate policy.
5. Announcement of the Monetary Policy Meeting Decisions on February 12, 1999 pointed out the following: 
(1) “corporate and household sentiments remain cautious and private sector activities stagnant”; and (2) “long-term
interest rates have risen considerably, and the yen has been appreciating against the dollar.” 
6. Governor Hayami, at a press conference on April 13, 1999, stated “until we reach a situation in which 
deflationary concerns are dispelled, we will continue the current policy of providing necessary liquidity to 
guide the uncollateralized overnight call rate down to virtually zero percent while paying due consideration to
maintaining the proper functioning of the market.”Over the past one year and a half, Japan’s economy has substantially improved,
due to such factors as support from macroeconomic policy, recovery of 
the world economy, diminishing concerns over the financial system, and 
technological innovation in the broad information and communications area.
At present, Japan’s economy is showing clearer signs of recovery, and this 
gradual upturn, led mainly by business fixed investment, is likely to continue.
Under such circumstances, the downward pressure on prices stemming from
weak demand has markedly receded. 
Considering these developments, the Bank of Japan feels confident that
Japan’s economy has reached the stage where deflationary concern has been
dispelled, the condition for lifting the zero interest rate policy.
7
Financial markets were very stable immediately after the termination of the zero
interest rate policy, and it was thus confirmed that market participants had received
the policy change calmly (Figure 1). In response to the above decision to change the
guideline for money market operations on August 11, 2000, the overnight call rate
rose to 0.25 percent, and interest rates on term instruments increased toward the end
of August, but were mostly stable thereafter.
B. Components of Zero Interest Rate Policy
In retrospect, important components of the “zero interest rate policy” as a policy
framework were (1) guiding the call rate to virtually zero percent (net of the transac-
tion cost in the interbank market); and (2) a commitment to the zero interest rate




















Figure 1  Market Interest Rates
7. The original statement can be viewed at the BOJ’s website (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/seisaku/00/seisak_f.htm).
Notes: PC1–3 denote the following policy changes:
PC1: Adoption of zero interest rate on February 12, 1999.
PC2: Governor’s announcement on the commitment to the zero interest rate “until
deflationary concerns are dispelled” at a press conference on April 13, 1999.
PC3: Termination of zero interest rate policy on August 11, 2000.
Sources: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly; Bloomberg.policy “until deflationary concerns are dispelled.” In other words, two aspects were
important for zero interest rate policy to be effective, namely, the “quantity” and the
“policy duration.” 
1. Quantitative aspect of the zero interest rate policy
If we focus first on the quantitative aspect of the zero interest rate policy, the BOJ
had guided the uncollateralized overnight call rate down to virtually zero percent by
providing ample funds that exceeded required reserves by ¥1 trillion.
8 In short, the
zero interest rate policy is a policy under which the BOJ provides ample funds until
interest rates fall to zero. In other words, in order to implement the zero interest rate
policy, the central bank needs to provide funds to meet all short-term credit demand,
guiding short-term interest rates to zero. 
Under this policy, we saw several phenomena evidencing how abundantly funds
have been provided. First, around 70 percent of the excess reserves of ¥1 trillion was
placed in the accounts of money market brokers (tanshi companies) held at the BOJ
(Figure 2). This suggests that financial institutions were no longer worried about
their liquidity positions and also their need to hold excess reserves was diminishing.
Another remarkable phenomenon was that under-subscription to the BOJ’s money
market operations had often been observed since the summer of 1999. This refers to
the situation where bids by financial institutions fall short of amounts. This meant
that even though the BOJ was providing funds at virtually the zero interest rate,
financial institutions did not subscribe for the full amount offered. In other words,
they were satiated with cash at zero cost of holding it. 
Over the year-end of 1999, in order to maintain the zero interest rate the BOJ
had to supply additional funds to meet increased demand for reserves in readiness for
possible Y2K problems. This suggests that increased demand for reserves, regardless
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Figure 2  Reserves of Financial Institutions
8. Financial institutions are legally required to keep reserves in the form of deposits with the BOJ, and amounting to
a little less than ¥4 trillion.
Source: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly.of reasons, will be automatically supported by the zero interest rate policy. Apart
from the Y2K period, which saw huge excess reserves when liquidity risk increased
(Figure 2), under-subscription had been the norm with respect to the BOJ’s opera-
tions, evidencing lack of demand for excess reserves on the part of private financial
institutions. It was thus apparent that private financial institutions’ demand for excess
reserves was lacking.
2. Policy duration effect of the zero interest rate policy
Next, considering the “policy duration” effect of the zero interest rate policy, interest
rates on longer-term instruments, such as three-month, six-month, and one-year
rates, as well as long-term interest rates are important. Such interest rates essentially
depend on how long the current abundant provision of funds will last rather than
how abundantly funds are provided.
The “policy duration” effects are underpinned by the “expectation theory” of
interest rate determination. Pure expectation theory tells us that long-term interest
rates today should basically reflect the future course of short-term interest rates. For
example, the one-year interest rate is determined by market expectations for
overnight interest rates from a given point in time until one year later. Based on a
more practical and general formula, long-term interest rates would be a sum of 
market expectations on the future course of short-term interest rates and a term 
premium (based on risk caused by uncertainty or the preference of market partici-
pants). Premiums being constant, fluctuations of interest rates on term instruments
reflect changes in expectations in this case. 
As economic conditions vary, the central bank cannot say it will not change the
short-term interest rates during any period of time regardless of economic or price
movements in practice. Hence, as a condition for terminating the zero interest rate
policy, the BOJ cannot give a definite time frame, but only say “not until deflationary
concerns are dispelled.” 
As a consequence, term interest rates have declined substantially to very low 
levels. Looking at short-term interest rates (as of February 2000), the three-month
rate was 0.04 percent and the one-year rate 0.12 percent. Such a decline in short-
term interest rates had worked as an anchor for medium- and long-term interest rates
through the intermarket arbitrage function, on which expectation theory was based.
Hence, the zero interest rate policy was highly effective in enhancing monetary 
easing, affecting the yield curve. 
To see the policy duration effect due to this commitment, it is useful to look 
at the implied forward rate (IFR) estimated from the short term interest rates 
(Figure 3). Since the introduction of the zero interest rate policy on February 12,
1999, IFRs were on a downward trend. However, from the middle of March 1999,
the IFRs, particularly those from six months to one year temporally, increased.
Observe that immediately after the announcement of the commitment on April 13,
1999 “until deflationary concerns are dispelled,” those IFRs declined again by June.
Although longer-term IFRs increased again after that, it is noteworthy that the IFRs
ranging from six months to one year remained around 0.1–0.2 percent after the yen’s
appreciation in summer 1999. On the contrary, in June to July 2000, IFRs ranging
from three months to six months, and from overnight to three months started rising
94 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/FEBRUARY 2001in succession, reflecting growing expectations of an early termination of the zero
interest rate policy. 
The above movements of IFRs indicate that the zero interest rate policy has an
automatic stabilizer element in its easing effect. That is, if the economy is on a down-
ward trend, market participants believe termination of the zero interest rate policy
should be put off, thus bringing longer-term interest rates down to flatten the yield
curve. To the contrary, if the economy is on an upward trend, market participants
believe the termination should get closer, thus raising longer-term interest rates to
steepen the yield curve rise, acting as a brake on the easing effect. 
In doing so, it is crucially important to promote the smoother formation of 
market expectations regarding the future course of monetary policy. Members of 
the BOJ’s Policy Board thus discussed deflationary concerns at every Monetary 
Policy Meeting and the BOJ publishes the minutes of such meetings as well as
Monthly Report of Recent Economic and Financial Developments. Therefore, the
zero interest rate policy could be regarded as a forward-looking monetary policy
framework taking into account market participants’ expectations through indicating
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9. See Ueda (1999, 2000). Taking into account that the economy continuously faces structural change, forward-
looking monetary policy management is not necessarily the same as automatic policy management using forecasts
based on past experience. This is discussed in the latter part of this paper when we refer to Greenspan (1997).

















Figure 3  Implied Forward Rates
Notes: PC1–3 denote the following policy changes:
PC1: Adoption of zero interest rate on February 12, 1999.
PC2: Governor’s announcement on the commitment to the zero interest rate “until
deflationary concerns are dispelled” at a press conference on April 13, 1999.
PC3: Termination of zero interest rate policy on August 11, 2000.
Source: Bloomberg.C. Quantitative Easing under Zero Interest Rate Policy
Since inflation is a monetary phenomenon, it is necessary to maintain money supply
growth at a level sufficiently high to fight deflationary pressures. To this end, interest
rates should be lowered and an ample monetary base provided. But, if it is deemed
desirable to increase money supply, the question remains whether the BOJ would 
be able to automatically increase it by expanding the monetary base. If the main 
constraint on the expansion of money supply is not related to the monetary base, 
it is natural that money supply will not grow significantly by providing an ample
monetary base and reducing banks’ funding costs to around zero percent. 
To compare the level of money supply to that of the real economic activities, we
plotted the trend value before the bubble period; calculated using a long time-series,
1970 to 1986) of Marshallian k (M2+CDs or monetary base/nominal GDP: the
inverse of the velocity of monetary aggregates) in terms of M2+CDs and monetary
base (Figure 4 [1] and [2]). It was found that the divergence of Marshallian k in
terms of monetary base has been expanding continuously since 1992 while the trend
of M2+CDs has been practically flat (from 1992 to 1996, though it declined below
the trend in 1997).
10 The difference between these movements possibly reflects the
decline in the financial intermediary function of financial institutions offsetting both
the monetary easing effect of low interest rates and expansion of the monetary base.
In this situation, the money multiplier is markedly decreasing (Figure 4 [3]).
11
In the meantime, banks are contributing to money supply growth by purchasing
government bonds and other assets instead of providing loans, which used to be a
main factor for money supply growth (Figure 5). Constraints on the expansion of
bank loans include such problems as (1) a decline in the risk-taking capacity of banks
resulting from the erosion of their capital due to nonperforming assets; (2) the lack of
profitable projects; and (3) the inability of many firms to borrow money because of
the debt incurred on previous projects. Unless such problems are solved through
appropriate measures corresponding to respective constraints, the provision of funds
will not result in the expansion of bank lending.
D. Effects and Limitation of Orthodox Operations
As to the aforementioned limits of quantitative easing, the simple and commonly
advocated counterargument is that the BOJ should inject more monetary base if the
monetary easing effect of supplying monetary base is constrained by some factors.
But under the zero interest rate policy, the effects of quantitative easing through
orthodox operations would be logically zero. Let us discuss this point from the 
viewpoint of substitutability between financial assets.
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10. The reason we chose to divide data in 1986 is we assume that the bubble period began in 1987. See Okina,
Shirakawa, and Shiratsuka (2001) for the detailed discussion on the definition of bubble period. We also assume
that the Marshallian k of nominal interest and the money multiplier effect cancel each other out. 
11. Since the money multiplier is a parameter reflecting household asset choice, lower interest rates would guide it
lower, with the opportunity cost of holding banknotes decreasing and the ratio of banknotes in circulation to
money supply increasing. The drop in the money multiplier in 1999 was largely caused by excess monetary 
base due to the zero interest rate policy. In fact, financial system instability increased from 1997 to 1998, but
from 1999 the financial intermediary function ceased deteriorating, indebted to policy responses including the
injection of public funds. Therefore, it is misleading to directly connect the money multiplier and the financial
intermediary function of banks. 97
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Figure 4  Marshallian k and Money Multiplier
Note: Trend of Marshallian k is computed with data from 1970 to 1986. 
Sources: Bank of Japan, Monetary and Economic Statistics Monthly; Economic 
Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts.
[1] Marshallian k in Terms of M2+CD










1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00









1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00
1970 to 86 averageUnder the zero interest rate policy, with the central bank providing reserves until
the short-term interest rate becomes zero, short-term government bills and the mone-
tary base become almost perfect substitutes. In such case, orthodox operations,
exchanging short-term government bills with the monetary base does not affect the
equilibrium. This is because, in a general equilibrium model of asset markets, the
equilibrium interest rate does not change with the exchange of two assets that are
almost perfect substitutes. Therefore, under the zero interest rate policy, quantitative
easing by conducting short-term government securities operations is not effective.
12
The same conclusion can be obtained in discussing monetary easing by not 
sterilizing intervention in the foreign exchange market. The proposal of unsterilized
intervention is meaningless, not only practically but theoretically, under a zero 
interest rate policy.
13
From a practical viewpoint, the amount involved in foreign exchange intervention
is trivial. Foreign exchange intervention amounts to only ¥1–3 trillion a month, as it
did even during the time of Deputy Minister of Finance Eisuke Sakakibara, com-
pared with the massive flow of funds in and out of the money markets, amounting to
a few trillion yen a day, or the BOJ’s massive provision of funds for Y2K problems,
which reached ¥50 trillion at their peak. It is thus meaningless to make an issue only
of funds stemming from foreign exchange intervention. In addition, foreign exchange
intervention in Japan is within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance (MOF),
and hence the BOJ, as its agent, cannot disclose such information at its discretion. As
a result, even if the BOJ announces unsterilized intervention, it cannot be held
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Figure 5  M2+CD and Credit
Source: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly.
12. Despite this situation, there have been efforts to shorten the time lag between the central bank’s short-term finan-
cial asset operation and the date of settlement. In this context, the effectiveness of operations could be improving. 
13. For practical issues related to sterilized versus unsterilized foreign exchange intervention, see Okina and
Shiratsuka (2000).accountable for its announcement since the information related to intervention was
not disclosed until August 2000.
14
Moreover, under the zero interest rate policy, discussing whether or not to sterilize
foreign exchange intervention is theoretically meaningless. Sterilization, in general,
means absorbing the monetary base, which is created by the foreign exchange market
interventions, by selling short-term financial assets. However, such operations under
the zero interest rate policy result in an exchange of perfectly substitutable financial
assets, thus never affecting the general equilibrium in the financial markets.
Therefore, whether foreign exchange intervention is sterilized or not, the equilibrium
should be unchanged.
15
Summing up the discussion above, under the zero interest rate policy, “quantita-
tive easing”—providing additional monetary base by orthodox operations, such as
buying short-term financial assets—does not affect the general equilibrium of interest
rates or amount of lending. In other words, providing monetary base under the zero
interest rate policy is not an effective monetary easing measure theoretically unless
the financial assets involved are not substitutes for the monetary base. This also
means that the level of monetary base, or reserves as a component, cannot be an
appropriate indicator for monetary conditions under the zero interest rate policy.
16
At the same time, we should bear in mind that this discussion is valid only when the
zero interest rate is maintained by providing ample monetary base. 
III. Academic Knowledge on Policy Options for Additional
Monetary Easing under Zero Interest Rate
As a next step, we will examine additional monetary easing under a zero interest 
rate policy, on which more attention has been focused from a theoretical point of
view. But before we do this in Chapter IV, we should briefly summarize policy 
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14. On August 7, 2000, the MOF released the results of Foreign Exchange Intervention Operations from April to
June 2000. More specifically, it disclosed the total amount of foreign exchange intervention operations for the
period from April through June 2000, and daily operations (the date, total amount of the day, and currency
pairs) in this period. Interested readers can download the original press release from (http://www.mof.go.jp/
english/feio/e124_6.htm).
15. From this argument, it can be concluded that as long as the BOJ is committed to the zero interest rate policy, the
MOF could conduct a kind of monetary easing through foreign exchange intervention. This is because, provided
the BOJ continues the zero interest rate policy, short-term government bills become equivalent to broad mone-
tary base. For example, MOF intervention, buying U.S. dollars and providing short-term government bills to the
market, is equal to the BOJ buying dollars and providing funds. Remember that such an aggressive foreign
exchange intervention, if ever conducted, might require the cooperation of other countries as well. 
16. Cole and Kocherlakota (1998) showed that a zero nominal interest rate environment could become a Pareto
Optimum (the so-called Freedman Rule) in a general equilibrium model, and proved that an optimal path of
monetary policy under zero interest rates imposes the following two constraints on the monetary base: (1) mone-
tary base converges to zero in the distant future; and (2) monetary base falls faster than the subjective discount
rate. In other words, under zero interest rates, since both an increase and decrease in monetary base could be an
optimal path in the short term, we obtain no information by looking at fluctuation of monetary base according
to the quantitative theory of money. In short, the argument “monetary base not increasing is evidence of poor
monetary policy management” is not persuasive under zero interest rates.
17. Readers can find a comprehensive discussion in Oda and Okina (2001).A. Theoretical Summary for Policy Options for Additional Monetary Easing
At the outset, it should be recognized that the knowledge of central bankers and
economists regarding the spillover effects of an easing monetary policy under a 
zero interest rate is limited. For example, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) argue,
“When the nominal rate is at zero, the only way a central bank can reduce the real
interest rate is to generate a rise in expected inflation. How the central bank should
go about this and whether cooperation from fiscal policy is necessary are important
open questions.” Indeed, there is no consensus on additional easing monetary 
policy under a zero interest rate because discussions are backed by different models
and different understanding of the way monetary policy influences the economy 
in the long run. 
Having stated the limitations, the arguments put forward can be summarized
under six headings.
18
[1] Quantitative easing through depreciation
In this argument, substantial intervention in the foreign exchange market can make
the yen depreciate through portfolio rebalancing effects and expectations for the yen’s
depreciation. If the monetary authorities succeed in doing this, corporate export
activities will be vitalized and the inflation rate will rise in line with the growth of the
economy (we can also expect a rise in import prices due to the yen’s depreciation). 
In this strategy, advocates focus on the belief in purchasing-power parity theory in
the long run and influence on expectations in the short run.
[2] Quantitative easing through penetration of portfolio rebalancing effects
Here, the monetary authorities purchase assets other than short-term financial 
assets, for example, more long-term government bonds than presently, and wait for
the permeation of quantitative easing effects through portfolio rebalancing effects in 
the long term. If the monetary authorities succeed in doing this, on the one hand
long-term interest rates will fall and, on the other, investments will recover since 
asset prices rise more than the replacement cost. In addition, consumption will be
activated in line with the recovery of asset prices. Thus, the economy will recover
gradually and inflation will gradually rise. Advocates of this strategy place more
importance on the neutrality of money in the long run initially and less on the 
influence on expectations.
[3] Quantitative easing working on credit channel
The monetary authorities commit to purchasing massive amounts of assets other
than short-term financial assets, for example, long-term government bonds, antici-
pating a rise in asset prices that could activate credit channels. Firstly, they expect an
improvement in household and corporate balance sheets, the recovery of collateral
prices, an increase in the net corporate asset value and capital of banks, and a gradual
rise in inflation. Importance is attached not only to the neutrality of money in the
long run but also the influence on expectations. A change in asset prices caused by 
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18. While we summarize many issues addressed by many authors, this is not to say that no other points remain. 
For example, Goodfriend (2000) ambitiously argues for the possibility of the introduction of negative nominal
interest on electronic money (taxation). We think that his proposal is very interesting. However, considering the
need for a substantial amount of investment and time for preparation to make this proposal operational, we do
not discuss it further here. a change in expectations can utilize the above-mentioned effects even though the
change in long-term interest rates is negligible.
[4] Stimulus of nominal aggregate demand close to fiscal functions
This argument expects that monetary policy will substitute for, or support, the
income-transfer function of fiscal policy. The most extreme way of doing this is by
issuing money through the underwriting of government bonds in compensation for a
tax cut. This means that monetary policy stimulates aggregate demand by financing
the fiscal deficit through actual “helicopter money” (i.e., a theoretical experiment
often found in finance textbooks that increases the monetary base through the 
dissemination of banknotes from a helicopter). In this strategy, advocates intend to
transfer purchasing power directly to households to stimulate nominal aggregate
demand and avoid deflation. However, it is necessary that such a policy be simul-
taneously implemented with fiscal policy. The aggregate demand stimulus effect 
will vary since it depends on expectations as to whether the tax cut is permanent or
temporary. The policy recommendation that a central bank should directly finance
the corporate sector by extending credit to corporations (which could use private
banks as agents) or finance government-affiliated financial institutions is also a form
of income transfer.
[5] Working on a dynamic path of expected inflation
This is a policy recommendation whereby the monetary authorities try to influence
the expected rate of inflation by changing monetary policy style such as announcing
an inflation target. In this argument, any measures to raise the inflation rate can 
be utilized as long as they influence market expectations. Hence, this argument 
is usually combined with the previous four arguments. Needless to say, the time 
horizon for influencing expectations is of consequence.
[6] Reflationary policy including equity and land prices
This argument is a mixture of Irving Fisher’s debt-deflation theory (Fisher [1933])
and the wisdom of recent finance theory on which argument (3) depends.
19 In Japan,
there is an argument supporting reflationary policy which holds that only inflation
can resolve the accumulation of government debt stemming from successive stimulus
packages and heightening corporate debt.
B. Policy Proposals from Abroad
As a next step in categorizing policy options, we examine recommendations emanat-
ing from abroad.
Bernanke (2000) supports quantitative easing through the yen’s depreciation
(argument [1] above) and holds that it is the most appropriate policy option, 
with arguments (3) and (4) being alternatives when it is impossible to induce depre-
ciation for any reason. At the same time, Bernanke (2000) suggests using inflation
targeting (argument [5]) with a commitment to a zero interest rate.
20 Meltzer (1999)
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19. Fisher’s debt-deflation theory has recently received attention because of prevailing recognition that, under infor-
mation asymmetry with respect to loans, a problem arises in which a decline in asset value decreases the payment
ability of economic entities which incurred liabilities, and deflation influences not income distribution but the
real economy (Bernanke [1995]).
20. In Bernanke (2000), fiscal policy is a given constant.and McKinnon (1999) hold different views regarding causes of the yen’s apprecia-
tion, but both recommend inducing depreciation.
21 Moreover, McCallum (2000)
emphasizes theoretical spillover effects of easing monetary policy based on the
exchange rates.
Goodfriend (2000) is representative of those who lean toward arguments (2) and
(3) simultaneously. He has a negative view of depreciation (argument [1]) for large
economies, and argues that, if the BOJ is to implement long-term government bond
purchasing operations, portfolio rebalancing effects (on which argument [2] is based)
will not suffice, and recommends large-scale bond purchasing operations which could
obtain the effects of argument (3). Goodfriend sees argument (4) as a complementary
policy to option (3). 
Krugman (1999a) is a typical paper, emphasizing the role of expectations as
described in argument (5). Krugman strongly recommends announcement of infla-
tion targeting to escape the liquidity trap.
22 He argues that both the yen’s depreciation
(argument [1]) and long-term government bond purchasing operations might require
the BOJ or the MOF to purchase foreign assets or government bonds equal to the
investment-savings gap in Japan. However, if Japanese held most U.S. government
bonds, it would cause a political problem, therefore he suggests that the direct 
influence on expectations described in argument (5) is desirable.
C. Policy Proposals at Home
Turning to arguments by authors at home, Hamada (1999) emphasizes the yen’s
depreciation as in argument (1). Since this argument has just been discussed and 
further details can be found in another paper,
23 we will not elaborate further here.
Regarding policy recommendations under arguments (2) and (3), many authors
recommend an increase in long-term government bond purchasing. However, ways
to achieve this differ from author to author. For example, Hamada (2000) insists 
on lowering long-term interest rates, Iwata (2000a, 2000b) recommends lowering
long-term interest rates in the short run but allowing them to rise over the medium
to long term, and Fukao (2000) advocates influencing inflation expectations through
long-term government bond purchasing operations to raise long-term interest rates
and influence expectations. There thus appears to be no consensus on this issue.
24
Moreover, Itoh and Shimoi (1999) recommend that the BOJ proactively effect long-
term government bond purchasing operations so as not to be politically pressured
into underwriting government bonds.
Apart from the difference in standpoint, there are many arguments that 
recommend an increase in long-term government bond purchasing operations. 
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21. In his policy recommendations, Meltzer (1999) argues that monetary easing through argument (2) is not enough
and McKinnon insists that the yen’s appreciation is caused by expectations that the yen will appreciate as a result
of trade friction with the United States, an area where monetary easing has no effects.
22. Krugman (1999b) also argues it is not likely that additional fiscal policy would let the economy jump to a 
“good equilibrium” among multiple equilibria (expectation for structural adjustment guides the economy to
expansionary equilibrium).
23. See Okina and Shiratsuka (2000).
24. Apart from the issue of the outright purchase of government bonds, Watanabe (2000) insists that influencing
expectations is important.The background to such argument generally takes into account two circumstances.
First, outright purchase of long-term government bonds seems to be a natural policy
option for additional quantitative easing, since it could be regarded as just an exten-
sion of the currently employed operation by the BOJ. In fact, as of February 2000,
the BOJ purchases long-term government bonds totaling ¥400 billion a month
(about ¥200 billion on two occasions), based on the principle that the operation
meets the increasing demand for banknotes in the long run, reflecting the economic
growth and resultant increase in payment transactions. Second, the fiscal debt and
limitations of fiscal policy are well recognized.
Indeed, the BOJ has already been effecting large-scale outright purchases of 
long-term government bonds compared with its assets and holds a large amount 
of government bonds. As mentioned, long-term government bond purchasing 
operations are conducted to meet the increasing demand for banknotes in the long
run, reflecting economic growth. Since the beginning of 1998, the ratio of the BOJ’s
purchase of government bonds to currency in circulation surpasses the growth rate of
currency in circulation except for the period corresponding to the Y2K problem
(Figure 6). In other words, the BOJ implements the outright purchase of long-term
government bonds on a larger scale than the growth in currency demand. This is
because the BOJ maintains the same level of government bond purchases, after it
doubled the size of operations from ¥200 billion to ¥400 billion in November 1997
when financial unease intensified and demand for currency increased. 
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Figure 6  Size of Outright Purchase Operation of JGBs
Note: Figures are five-month moving average.
Source: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly.However, there has not been any influence on long-term interest rates (Figure 7).
On the other hand, as a result of the outright purchase of long-term government
bonds, the BOJ’s government bond holdings amount to nearly 40 percent of its total
assets, similar to the case of the United States (Table 1). However, the ratio of the
BOJ’s holdings of government bonds to the total amount of long-term government
bonds issued was only 11 percent at end-March 1999.
Next, we should consider the fiscal debt situation and the boundary of fiscal 
policy. Japan’s dependency on public bonds (national budget, flow basis) in fiscal
2000 skyrocketed to 38.4 percent from 10.6 percent in 1990. On a stock basis, 
long-term debt is equivalent to 132.9 percent of GDP in fiscal 2000 (based on the
government outlook), said to be the worst level among industrialized countries.
While conditions for the sustainability of Japan’s fiscal debt have been satisfied in
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Figure 7  Amounts of Outright Purchase Operation of JGBs and Market Rates
Source: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly.
Table 1  Central Banks’ Holding of Government Bonds
Outright
Time Total assets purchase of (b)/(a) Long
(a) government government (c)/(a)
bonds (b) bonds (c)
BOJ End-March 79.7 49.1 61.5% 29.7 37.3% (¥ trillions) 1999
FRB End-December 5,446 4,521 83.0% 2,082 38.2% (US$100 millions) 1998
ECB Beginning 6,994 602 8.6% n.a. n.a. (100 million euros) January 1999
Note: Regarding the FRB, long government bonds refer to those with maturity of more than one year. 
Sources: Bank of Japan, Activities by the Bank of Japan; Federal Reserve Board, 85th Annual Report,
1998; European Central Bank, Consolidated Opening Financial Statement of the Eurosystem as
at 1 January 1999.many empirical studies, based on most recent data Doi (1999) reports that such 
conditions were not fulfilled regarding Japan’s general fiscal budget during 1956–98.
Based on these circumstances, Iwata (2000a) points out that “Taking into account
the diminishing urgency of the situation and to minimize the bad effects of economic
policy heavily weighted on fiscal policy, more weight should be given to monetary
and structural policy to reduce dependence on fiscal policy.” He suggests that the
outright purchase operations of long-term government bonds increases private-sector
cash holdings even in a liquidity trap, and hence could increase money supply even in
the absence of demand for funds.
D. Framework to Evaluate Policy Options
The most sensible expansionary policy under a zero interest rate is an expansionary
fiscal policy as suggested by Keynes.
25 However, this traditional way of resolution is
useless under circumstances in which the sustainability of fiscal debt is uncertain.
The standard resolution for the ideal relation between the fiscal burden and 
monetary policy is, as Frenkel (1998) points out from the lesson of the fiscal debt of
industrialized countries in the 1980s, that monetary policy should not deviate from
attempting to achieve its main objectives and fiscal imbalances should, in principle,
be dealt with by structural reform. However, such a policy recommendation cannot
easily be accepted in Japan at the present juncture.
IV. Transmission Channel for Outright Purchase of Long-Term
Government Bonds under Zero Interest Rate
Chapters IV to VI will study the effects, risks, and side effects of the additional easing
of monetary policy under zero interest rate, focusing on the outright purchase 
operations of long-term government bonds that have so often been recommended. As
discussed in the previous chapter, we elaborate this topic because of its theoretical
interest and to obtain some lessons for the conduct of monetary policy under zero
interest rate. Thus, our discussion is not directly related with the conduct of the
bank’s monetary policy in the near future. In this chapter, we summarize the effects
of the outright purchase of long-term government bonds.
A. Impacts of Market Operations to Exchange Imperfectly Substitutable
Financial Assets
Goodfriend (2000) provides a useful basis to understand the economic stimulus
effect of the outright purchase of long-term government bonds.
26 Although we give
details in the Appendix, the crux of his discussion is that the outright purchase of
long-term government bonds under zero interest rate influences the real economy 
by the following two channels: (1) portfolio rebalancing effects; and (2) affecting 
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25. Meyer (1999) argues that “in case of a nominal interest rate boundary, fiscal policy could and should carry more
of the stabilization burden, as has been the case in Japan recently.”
26. Although Goodfriend (2000) very ambitiously argues for the possibility of the introduction of negative nominal
interest on electronic money (taxation), in this paper we only treat issues relevant to the outright purchase of 
government bonds. the external finance premium through a change in the collateral value of assets and
subsequent change in banks’ lending activities. Considering the latter aspect, the role
of expectations is important. It should be noted that the BOJ’s intention for effecting
the outright purchase of long-term government bonds has hitherto been to meet 
continuous increase in demand for liquidity as the economy grows. Thus, it is totally
different in nature from the role expected by the outright purchase of long-term 
government bonds mentioned here.
Considering the effects of the outright purchase of short-term government 
bonds under zero interest rate from this point of view, there would be no portfolio
rebalancing effects and no effects stemming from change in the external finance 
premium, if money only accumulated as deposits of tanshi money brokers with the
BOJ. Regarding the effects of such operations on expectations, there could be some if 
market participants believed that the increase in the monetary base was conveying a
monetary policy message (regardless of the reason) as market participants focus on
the amount of excess reserve (its effectiveness is uncertain because the effects are
based on a misconception). However, since theoretical aspects cannot explain the
effects except for the impacts on expectations, it is difficult for central banks to use
such operations to send their messages. 
Before moving on to the practical issues regarding the outright purchase of 
long-term government bonds, it is useful to overview empirical knowledge with
respect to two operations where a central bank intends to influence asset markets that
have high but not perfect substitutability: (1) “operation twists” and (2) sterilized
intervention. Note that the discussion in the remaining part of this chapter differs
from that of Goodfriend (2000), because his discussion presumes that both short and
long interest rates are pressed against zero, while the following discussions do not.
27
“Operation twists,” which were executed under the Kennedy administration, are
the precedent for exchanging short- and long-term government bonds. This experi-
ment was conducted for the purpose of raising short-term interest rates to encourage
short-term capital inflow to defend the U.S. dollar and to lower long-term interest
rates to promote domestic corporate investment.
According to Shiller (1990), a study of that time which analyzed the effectiveness
of “operation twists” by testing whether a proxy variable for government debt policy
has additional significance for a model which regressed long-term interest rates by the
distribution lag of short-term interest rates, no evidence was found that government
debt management policy was effective. Since then, such analysis has been criticized
because it treats expectations as given and government debt management policy as
exogenous. Shiller (1990) sums up that the stricter the model the more subjective is the
treatment of expectations and determination of endogenous and exogenous variables,
and that therefore it is difficult to come to any robust, quantitative conclusion.
Apart from empirical analysis, though the “operation twists” were not effective in
lowering long-term interest rates, theoretically it may be conjectured that this was
because of the operation’s small scale at the time and that a larger-scale operation
could have been effective. 
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27. See the Appendix for the details on this point.It is possible to understand that the outright purchase of long-term government
bonds is an experiment to employ the operation intends to lower long-term interest
rates, while maintaining zero short-term interest rates. In this context, it is under-
standable that an experiment on a massive scale might be necessary for certain effects
to materialize. However, in the case of an experiment to discover whether long-term
interest rates are controllable, significant factors on the effectiveness of the operation
include not only the question of whether the operation is on a large scale or not, but
also the expectations of market participants in an experimental environment. The latter
include expectations regarding future monetary policy and the inflation rate formed by
market participants reflecting the economy’s current situation, the risk premium 
stemming from uncertainty and the development of future fiscal policy, and so forth. 
Next, the issue of sterilized intervention in foreign exchange markets suggests 
the following points regarding portfolio rebalancing effects between domestic 
currency-denominated assets and foreign currency-denominated assets.
28
First, if domestic bonds and foreign bonds are perfectly substitutable, unsterilized
intervention has no effects. However, from the theoretical viewpoint, if domestic
bonds and foreign bonds are not perfectly substitutable, intervention can devalue 
the local currency through portfolio rebalancing effects. Second, it is not sterilized
intervention itself but the monetary authorities revealing their monetary policy
stance that often influences market expectations (signaling effects).
29 Empirically, the
recognition that portfolio rebalancing effects are small has been spreading and the
main concerns have focused on the effects of sterilized intervention influencing 
monetary policy expectations (signaling effects).
B. Conditions for Enhancing the Effectiveness of Outright Purchase of 
Long-Term Government Bonds
Based on the suggestion of “operation twists” and sterilized intervention, the effects
of operations, which exchange some assets for imperfectly substitutable ones, 
comprise two elements: (1) influencing the economy by changing the return on 
several asset classes; and (2) changing expectations with regard to the future course of
policy actions. Moreover, among these two elements, we find that the latter is likely
to be more effective. Such suggestions are consistent with the view of Goodfriend
(2000) that expectations play a role in the process of raising asset prices. 
In addition, Goodfriend (2000) argues that for additional quantitative monetary
easing effects to permeate, open market operations might depend on the expectation
of future intentions for open market operations, as the effect of present monetary 
policy depends on expectations for short-term interest rates. He also argues that to
influence private-sector expectations, the injection of a larger monetary base than in
normal times might be needed in terms of the practicality of operations. In this regard,
attention should be paid to amounts and frequency of operations in the future.
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28. See Eijffinger (1998), a recent survey paper dealing with this subject.
29. However, due to data constraints regarding foreign exchange intervention it is not yet clear whether “talk down
or up” is sufficient to indicate the stance of the authorities, or whether to attain market credibility the authorities
need to make some commitment such as an indication that they will shoulder the cost if they take contradictory
actions. It is also not clear as to what extent signaling effects would actually be observed.The views of scholars on the effects of such policy vary. Bryant (2000) recommends
operations in foreign exchange markets, arguing “I would like to insist more strongly
than Goodfriend has insisted that under the liquidity trap the effect of the outright 
purchase of long-term government bonds is uncertain and not dependable.” Woodford
(1999) takes the position that if the expectation theory of the term structure of 
interest rates holds, then the effectiveness of such operations does not come from the
effect of the outright purchase of long-term government bonds but is dependent on
whether the central bank can make a credible commitment to future monetary policy.
From this point of view, a necessary condition for promoting the effectiveness of
the outright purchase of long-term government bonds might be that the monetary
authorities dared to commit to greater operations than market participants expected.
Although the impacts of such a policy on the expectations held by the market 
participants are uncertain, further study is required on private-sector expectations
with regard to the future course of asset prices. 
V. Two Views on the Implementation of Outright Purchase of
Long-Term Governments Bonds under the Zero Interest 
Rate Policy
Bearing the previous theoretical summary in mind, let us assume that the BOJ 
aims at further monetary easing by increasing the outright purchase of long-term
government bonds under the zero interest rate policy. There are two specific options
depending on which of the following two paths the central bank emphasizes: (1) a
decline in long-term interest rates; or (2) private-sector expectations with respect to a
change in the zero interest rate policy, future inflation, and asset price developments.
The first option is to gradually increase the amount of conventional outright 
purchases of long-term government bonds that the BOJ used to implement. In this
case, the decrease in the long-term government bond yield will be emphasized as a
channel through which monetary easing is transmitted and the effects working on
market participants’ expectation will be relatively mild. Let us call this option the
“mild outright purchase of long-term government bonds.”
30
The second path is, in order to make easing effects more dramatic, to implement
massive and active operations by emphasizing their difference from conventional 
outright purchase operations. This aims at having both portfolio rebalancing effects
and actively affecting expectations and credit channels. We call this the “aggressive
outright purchase operation of long-term government bonds.”
As previously mentioned, when the authorities select from the various policy
options, a basic viewpoint is to compare anticipated effects with risks or side effects.
In addition, it should be noted that such effects as well as risks or side effects depend
considerably on economic conditions at the time, including market participants’
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30. Even regarding an operation which the BOJ does not announce and which is considered mild, the fact that 
the BOJ has increased the outright purchase of long-term government bonds might be received by market 
participants as a strong message and thereby temporarily affect expectations significantly. However, such was not
the case in November 1997.expectations as to future monetary policy and inflation which are formed by reflect-
ing such economic conditions. In the following, by making a clear distinction
between the two options on the outright purchase of long-term government bonds,
the effects, problems in implementation, and risks or side effects are discussed.
When we take into account the current situation of the Japanese government
bond (JGB) market, these operations are likely to change illiquid long-term bonds
held by financial institutions into monetary base.
31 Liquid long-term government
bonds must have been already playing an important role as collateral for financial
transactions or tools for risk hedging. Therefore, a central bank increasingly buying
only such highly liquid bonds will, ceteris paribus, likely aggravate market functioning
and, moreover, financial institutions are not expected to bid in operations featuring
such liquid bonds.
32 If this is the case, implementing an operation aiming at a specific
illiquid issue so as to minimize the adverse impact on the government bond market
will give financial institutions an opportunity to newly rebalance portfolios.
A. Mild Operations of Outright Purchase of Long-Term Government Bonds
1. Implementation and effects
While “mild operations” will change the role of the outright purchase of long-term
government bonds from a conventional response to increasing long-term demand 
for banknotes to a monetary easing measure to complement the zero interest rate 
policy, operationally speaking it can be regarded as an extension of the conventional
outright operation.
By gradually increasing the outright purchase amount of long-term government
bonds, the BOJ expects to see the decrease in the yield of long-term government
bonds. For example, Bernanke (2000) states that once the outright purchases of long-
term government bonds are implemented, “imperfect substitutability between assets
would assert itself, and the prices of assets being acquired would rise.” In addition,
Iwata (2000a) argues that the outright purchases of long-term government bonds are
effective even when the economy is in a liquidity trap in that they (1) activate stock
investment through reducing risk premium, and (2) encourage investment in other
high-risk assets.
However, we consider that the impact on expectations, which influence the 
external finance premium, is weak. Thus, its effect on banks’ lending behavior would
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31. See Shirakawa (1999) for a current analysis of market liquidity in the JGB market. When looking at the bid-ask
spread, an indicator of the liquidity of the JGB market, the spread is the largest for all types of maturity among
industrial countries. For example, if we take the “current issue,” a 10-year bond issued most recently and 
the largest in terms of issue amount in Japan, the bid-ask spread is 0.7 percent of face value, larger than that 
in the United States (0.03 percent), the United Kingdom (0.04 percent), Canada (0.05 percent), and Italy 
(0.06 percent). The same tendency can also be seen for bonds of different maturity. In addition, while market
liquidity measured by the bid-ask spread generally declines as the maturity lengthens in major overseas govern-
ment bond markets, in Japan the bid-ask spread becomes the smallest for government bonds with a 7-10 year
maturity (long-term zone). Furthermore, if we compare Japanese and U.S. bond turnover by issue year, Japan 
is overwhelmingly concentrated in the long-term zone. And, finally, turnover in the futures market is greater 
than that in the spot market, indicating the relatively higher liquidity of the futures market and active use to
complement the low liquidity of the spot market. 
32. This can easily be imagined from the situation in which the size of the U.S. Treasury bond buyback program
announced in January 2000 exceeded what market participants had expected, and in the most liquid U.S.
Treasury bond market 30-year bonds quickly came to be seen as overpriced.be limited given the current situation in which credit channels are not facilitating
lending and thereby not stimulating the economy. For example, while short- and
long-term interest rates have been declining, average contracted interest rates on new
loans have shown little change (Figure 8).
33
In sum, the best scenario that the BOJ can expect from the mild outright 
purchase operations of long-term government bonds is that nominal interest rates
initially decline, but then subsequently rise along with a rise in inflation expectations
as anticipation of an economic recovery increases. If the economy does recover 
gradually and leads to a scenario where increased tax revenues prompt fiscal recon-
struction, then a situation can be avoided in which the term premium substantially
increases and long-term interest rates rapidly rise. However, even in such a case, it is
most likely there would be a long time lag between implementation of the operation
and the materialization of effects on prices and economic activity. Moreover, the
effects are extremely uncertain.
2. Risks or side effects
The following risks are inherent in the mild outright purchase of long-term 
government bonds.
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Figure 8  Average Contracted Interest Rates on Loans
Source: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly.
33. Note that there were more corporate insolvencies in those periods, therefore credit risk, which can only be recog-
nized ex post, might have well increased. Such interest rate development suggests there might be some factors that
have offset an increase in the credit risk premium. In addition, it should be noted that the overdraft rate declined
more rapidly than other lending rates, while average contracted interest rates on new loans did not cover the 
overdraft rate. Therefore, it might be the case that overall lending rates including overdraft lending declined a 
little more rapidly.First of all, as “operation twists” in the United States have had few effects, effects of
the operation might not be observed since it is mild, resulting in a prolonged operation
and, in the meantime, funds provided through the outright purchase of long-term 
government bonds might accumulate in the BOJ’s current account. As previously
mentioned, the outstanding balance of long-term government bonds that accounts 
for 40 percent of the BOJ’s balance sheet only corresponds to some 10 percent of 
long-term government bonds outstanding as a whole. Therefore, compared with the
BOJ’s balance sheet a mild operation might result in being ineffective.
Second, unless the effects of the outright purchases of long-term government
bonds materialize relatively quickly, bonds will increasingly accumulate on the BOJ’s
balance sheet, thereby perhaps inducing a long-term fiscal burden. Such concerns
might well push up long-term interest rates more than expected inflation by affecting
term premiums. By “term premium,” we mean the risk premium with uncertainties
in the future development of interest rates and inflation rates. Indeed, it could be
suggested that the adoption of inflation targeting might restrain the uncertainty of
inflation risk. However, inflation policy is expected to raise the inflation rate, some-
thing that has never been tried before. It seems impossible for the central bank to
reduce the inflation rate at will even in a period of disinflation. Furthermore, if the
central bank tried to inflate the economy at any cost, excessive easing would result in,
and the resulting stop-go policy would lead to, a higher variability of interest rates
and inflation expectations. Higher uncertainty regarding future inflation would
increase long-term interest rates, reflecting the increased risk premium.
B. Aggressive Operations of Outright Purchase of Long-Term Government
Bonds
1. Implementation and effects
The aggressive outright purchase of long-term government bonds aims at actively
working on private-sector expectations about the future course of monetary opera-
tions, interest rates, and asset prices through making a commitment to implement
operations in a size far more than normally expected, thereby not only raising asset
prices but also increasing bank lending. This is based on the authors’ belief that, at
present, there is little possibility operations in small quantities will have any effect on
expectations which, in turn, affect asset prices and private expenditures.
Therefore, for aggressive outright purchases of long-term government bonds to 
be effective, expectations with respect to future operations are quite important. In
this case, as an advocate of this type of operation, Goodfriend (2000) argues that
“Ordinarily, relatively small changes in aggregate bank reserves are sufficient to 
support interest rate policy actions. At the interest rate floor, however, open market
purchases must influence liquidity broadly defined in order to be effective. That 
may require large-scale injections of monetary base, perhaps orders of magnitude
larger than usual.” However, since there is a high degree of uncertainty about the
effects of exchanging long-term government bonds for monetary base, in actual
implementation the size and frequency of operations are ambiguous. 
Taking into account these points, aggressive operations should be regarded as a
high-risk, high-return policy option verging on a high-stakes bet. Although they try
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quite uncertain since the key of the operations is how they affect expectations.
Nonetheless, such a bet would be worth making if the Japanese economy faced a very
serious recession, and counting on the policy duration effect of the zero interest rate
policy looked insufficient given the economic conditions. 
2. Risks or side effects
The aggressive outright purchase of long-term government bonds involves the 
following risks.
The first risk relates to how one assesses the effects of the aggressive outright 
purchase of long-term government bonds on expectations. Iwata (2000a) argues that
if a central bank declares its commitment to such operations, it would affect market
expectations and enable a decline in long-term interest rates and a rise in stock prices.
An important question here is what would happen to the term premiums
requested for long-term interest rates. A term premium might reflect both risk pre-
mium on uncertainty about future inflation and credit risk regarding government
bonds. The fact that long-term interest rates have been stable at 1–2 percent under a
monetary policy which embarked on an unprecedented zero interest rate can be
attributed to the following two factors. First, expectations that short-term interest
rates will remain low on the presumption of expected stable inflation. Second, the
absence of heightening credit risk attaching to government bonds, despite downgrad-
ing by rating agencies such as Moody’s, since they factor in the BOJ’s stable policy
stance that puts emphasis on the maintenance of fiscal discipline. 
In Japan, where calls for fiscal reform have intensified, it is probable that a 
massive increase in the outright purchase of government bonds is seen by the public
as a loss of fiscal discipline or recognized as virtually equivalent to the central 
bank’s underwriting of government bonds. Thus, it would likely result in the further
downgrading of JGBs, thus leading to the situation where government bond 
price formation is to a large extent determined from the viewpoint of credit risk. In
addition, if uncertainty about the outlook for inflation increases due to the decisive
outright purchase of government bonds, inflation risk premium also rises. Based on
these two factors, the central bank’s commitment to a massive increase in the outright
purchase of government bonds would rapidly see long-term interest rates rising more
than expected inflation and force fiscal conditions into a further difficult situation.
Under such a scenario, as Asher (1999) stated, there is a risk that the outright 
purchase of government bonds itself would become a crucial factor inducing 
economic deterioration through a hike in long-term interest rates and a substantial
adverse impact on fiscal conditions.
The second risk is that the BOJ might incur a substantial capital loss, resulting in
a serious burden on the government’s budget in the future. If the BOJ’s commitment
to “aim at positive inflation within the range of price stability while maintaining the
zero interest rate policy until deflationary concerns are dispelled” is believed by the
market, it is the same as an increase in long-term interest rates and maintenance of
the zero interest rate (at least to prevent an inverted yield curve); in other words, “the
BOJ incurring a substantial capital loss” will be factored into market expectations
from the beginning. In such a case, the best scenario would be the aggressive outright
112 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/FEBRUARY 2001purchase of long-term government bonds first leading to a substantial decline in
long-term interest rates, followed by a rise in asset prices and inflation, and then the
BOJ naturally shifting away from the zero interest rate policy.
34
Against such a view, while a case in which the BOJ becomes insolvent is not
envisaged in the current Bank of Japan Law, there is a view that even if the BOJ’s
payments to the treasury decrease, it would be a trivial problem if one looks at the
balance sheet of the government and the BOJ together.
35 However, as we explain
later, if we consider the fact that monetary base provided by the aggressive outright
purchase of government bonds should eventually be absorbed in order to maintain
inflation within a range of price stability, the fiscal burden will not end with a 
temporary capital loss.
Let us assume that monetary base provided through additional monetary easing is
geared toward bank lending and, in order to prevent money supply from increasing
too much, the BOJ tries to bring total monetary base back to a level prior to the
implementation of additional monetary easing. However, since prices of long-term
government bonds that the BOJ holds have already fallen sharply by the time the
BOJ absorbs the monetary base, the monetary base provided additionally in the past
might not be fully absorbed even if the BOJ sold all long-term government bonds it
was holding. In this case, the BOJ would be forced to additionally sell its long-term
financial assets to absorb the money. Therefore, an increase in long-term interest rates
and maintenance of the zero interest rate (at least to prevent an inverted yield
curve)—in other words, to declare that the BOJ will incur a substantial capital loss—
might well result in increasing the private holding of government debt as Goodfriend
(2000) points out. In this sense, the outright purchase of long-term government
bonds can be eventually regarded as a fiscal policy measure. We will return to this
point later.
C. Size of Operations and Capital Loss of the BOJ
What would be the practical validity of applying a scenario involving a specific 
purchase amount and interest rate to the two views regarding the outright purchase
of long-term government bonds? To this end, we provide a simple estimation of the
size of operations and the magnitude of capital loss in the following.
At the outset, it should be noted that mild and aggressive operations cannot be
distinguished by the sheer size of the operations. First, whether an operation is mild
or aggressive depends on the extent to which the BOJ intends to actively work on 
the public expectations. Second, there is no quantitative criterion on the amount 
necessary to make an operation aggressive.
In evaluating the risk attaching to such an operation, the important factor is a rise
in the term premium, but we cannot necessarily assume a linear relationship between
the size of operation and the term premium.
36 It is impossible to precisely forecast not
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34. It should be noted that if effects on expectations are very strong, long-term interest rates may rise from the outset,
asset prices rise further, and external fund premiums decline. 
35. A typical argument can be found in Iwata (2000a) and Bernanke (2000).
36. Please remember that by “term premium” we mean the risk premium with the uncertainties in the future 
development of interest rates and inflation rates.only the term premium but also the capital loss that would be incurred by the BOJ
since long-term interest rates would be significantly affected by economic conditions
at the time and changes in expectations. Nevertheless, to know the extent to which
the BOJ would incur a capital loss would likely provide a certain reference point.
In this context, let us look at the relationship between quantitative monetary
indexes and nominal economic activity. At present, Marshallian k, or the inverse of
velocity of money, measured by M2+CDs, has been substantially above the trend
reflecting easy monetary conditions (Figure 4 [1]). On the other hand, the money
multiplier has substantially declined and the money surplus in terms of monetary
base has further expanded (Figure 4 [1], [2], and [3]).
This can be theoretically summarized as follows. If we denote k as Marshallian 
k and  φ as the money multiplier, since (M2+CDs) = k*(nominal GDP) and
(M2+CDs) = φ *(monetary base), then we obtain (nominal GDP) = (φ /k)*(monetary
base).
While the above formula does not describes causality, a decline in k is emphasized
from the viewpoint of portfolio rebalancing since funds will eventually shift to assets
such as stocks. On the other hand, an idea that risk taking by the banking sector
should be strengthened in order to heighten φ will be emphasized from the viewpoint
of credit channels. That one cannot accurately forecast the consequence of the 
outright purchase of long-term government bonds means that it is necessary to look
at k and φ with a certain leeway. 
In the following, we estimated, when k and φ change, how the level of nominal
GDP consistent with such changes compares with that of 1999 using average 
1999 monetary base as a benchmark. Namely, in the formula (nominal GDP) =
(φ /k)*(monetary base), we fixed the level of monetary base as the average of 1999
monetary base, and let k and φ take various values (Figure 9). 
Plausible values for k and φ have to be contemplated based on the experience 
of Japan’s economy, and when we assume that k changes to the level of the trend 
during 1970–86 and φ to the average of the same period, then we obtain a result that
nominal GDP needs to rise some 22 percent from the level of 1999.
37 We do not
think that a 22 percent increase in nominal GDP will be achieved solely by inflation.
However, the estimate suggests that when an operation is implemented and k and φ
rapidly return to the trend, even Japan’s economy achieves 3 percent annual real
growth for two years, and 8 percent annual inflation would still be necessary. Under
such a situation, we think monetary tightening is necessary. 
Taking these points into account, even if the BOJ makes additional fund 
provision in the future through the outright purchase of long-term government
bonds, it is likely that, after the economic recovery, the BOJ will be required to
absorb the funds in an amount more than it provided. This implies that a powerful
drug such as the central bank’s massive outright purchase of long-term government
bonds is accompanied by a risk that after full throttle it becomes difficult to contain
inflation to a mild level unless the central bank suddenly puts on the brake.
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37. For reasons for using data up to 1986, see Footnote 10.Taking into account the points mentioned above, we present our estimate of the
cost and the total amount of operations with respect to the outright purchase of 
government bonds. In the following, we neglected the possibility of absorbing 
additional fund provision and assumed that, after economic recovery, the amount
provided through the additional outright purchase of government bonds would be
absorbed by the central bank’s selling of its long-term government bonds.
As a reference for considering the mild outright purchase of long-term govern-
ment bonds, we first estimated the maximum size of operation the BOJ can imple-
ment if it does not declare a response to an emergency situation. Thus, the BOJ tries
to limit the impact of the operation on its financial position to a range within which
it can cope. Specifically, we assume that the BOJ contains a possible future capital
loss within its “reserve for possible losses on securities transactions” (¥2.4 trillion as 
of end-September 1999).
38 Under this assumption, we estimate the possible size of
operation, with the various combinations of time-to-repurchase and long-term 
interest rates at that time.
As a next step, we make a simple estimation of the size of capital loss related to
the aggressive outright purchase of long-term government bonds. In this case, the
BOJ is assumed to conduct an operation regardless of the impact on its financial
position. We tentatively assume that the BOJ purchases ¥60 trillion in long-term
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38. The BOJ is allowed to appropriate the “reserve for possible losses on securities transactions,” pursuant to Article
15 of the Enforcement Ordinance of the Bank of Japan Law and other related rules and regulations, to cover a
net loss of securities transactions.
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Figure 9  Degree of Excessiveness of Monetary Aggregates
Note: Plotted lines are combinations of the Marshallian k and monetary multiplier that
correspond to the average amount of monetary base in 1999 and the nominal
GDP. Nominal GDP must increase from   to  , if the Marshallian k and 
monetary multiplier return to the trend and average of 1970–86, respectively. 
Sources: Bank of Japan, Monetary and Economic Statistics Monthly; Economic 
Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts.government bonds, which corresponds to 10 percent of the outstanding amount of
M2+CDs, and 20 percent of that of long-term government bonds. In both cases, we
compute the capital loss of long-term government bonds, under the assumption that
we purchase the long-term government bonds with a 2 percent coupon and 10-year
time-to-maturity at par, implying that long-term interest rates are currently at 
2 percent (Table 2 [Reference]).
First, let us look at the estimates of a mild outright purchase operation of long-
term government bonds (Table 2 [1]). If long-term interest rates do not rise from the 
current level and remain at around 2.5 percent despite the BOJ’s operation, and if
the BOJ sells them back one or two years from now, the BOJ could implement a 
sizable ¥60–70 trillion operation within a capital loss of some ¥2.4 trillion. This
amount almost corresponds to the size of the aggressive outright purchase operation
of long-term government bonds. However, if we assume that long-term interest rates
will rise to 5 percent (3–4 percent long-term real interest rates reflecting the term
premium plus 1–2 percent expected inflation), which is not so high compared 
with rates witnessed in the previous economic recovery phase, the total amount of
operation which the BOJ can implement would be limited to about ¥12 trillion.
Since the BOJ has been implementing the outright purchase of long-term govern-
ment bonds in the amount of ¥400 billion monthly (¥4.8 trillion annually) as of
February 2000, this ¥12 trillion limitation means that if the BOJ tries to realize a
¥12 trillion operation within one year, the magnitude would be 2.5 times the current
one, and 1.25 times if it tries to realize it within two years. If the BOJ assumed more
risk from an interest rate rise or the possibility that it would be forced to additionally
sell long-term government bonds it holds and thus incur capital losses, the amount of
operation would be further suppressed.
Next, we make a simple estimation of the size of capital loss related to the 
aggressive outright purchase of long-term government bonds (Table 2 [2]). As 
mentioned above, if the BOJ purchases ¥60 trillion in long-term government bonds,
it is only when long-term interest rates rise a little and remain around 2.5 percent
that a capital loss accompanied by an interest rate rise is contained within the range
of the ¥2.4 trillion “reserve for possible losses on securities transactions.” If we
assume that long-term interest rates rise to 5 percent, the BOJ would incur a capital
loss of about ¥12 trillion when it sells back the purchased long-term government
bonds in one to two years and about ¥8 trillion if it sells in five years. Since the 
monetary base that corresponds to such capital losses cannot be entirely absorbed 
by selling the purchased bonds through the BOJ’s operation, the BOJ would be
forced to additionally sell other assets, resulting in the private sector holding more
government debt in the long run. 
A further counterargument is that such potential capital loss could be offset by an
increase in the BOJ’s operating income, reflecting higher interest rates for the assets
on the Bank’s balance sheet after terminating the zero interest rate policy. However,
even if we assume an optimistic scenario in which the short-term interest rate and
long-term interest rate shift by the same amount, it will take more than five years to
cover the additional capital loss from an aggressive outright purchase of long-term
government bonds through such increases in operating income (Table 2 [3]). The
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Table 2  Size of Outright Purchase Operations of JGBs
[1] Amount of Outright Purchase in Mild Operations
¥ trillions
Long-term rate
Timing of absorbing reserves (years later)
12345
2.5 60.2 66.9 75.6 87.1 103.3
3.0 30.8 34.2 38.5 44.3 52.4
3.5 21.0 23.3 26.2 30.0 35.4
4.0 16.1 17.8 20.0 22.9 27.0
4.5 13.2 14.6 16.3 18.6 21.9
5.0 11.3 12.4 13.8 15.8 18.5
5.5 9.9 10.8 12.1 13.7 16.1
6.0 8.8 9.7 10.7 12.2 14.2
[2] Capital Loss from Aggressive Operations
¥ trillions
Long-term rate
Timing of absorbing reserves (years later)
12345
2.5 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.4
3.0 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.7
3.5 6.8 6.2 5.5 4.8 4.1
4.0 8.9 8.1 7.2 6.3 5.3
4.5 10.9 9.9 8.8 7.7 6.6
5.0 12.8 11.6 10.4 9.1 7.8
5.5 14.6 13.3 11.9 10.5 9.0
6.0 16.3 14.9 13.4 11.8 10.1
[3] Interest Rate Revenues from the Bank’s Short-Term Assets 
¥ trillions
Short-term rate
Timing of absorbing reserves (years later)
12345
1.0 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.4 1.7
1.5 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.1 2.6
2.0 0.7 1.4 2.1 2.8 3.5
2.5 0.8 1.7 2.6 3.5 4.5
3.0 1.0 2.1 3.2 4.3 5.4
3.5 1.2 2.4 3.7 5.0 6.4
4.0 1.3 2.8 4.3 5.8 7.5
4.5 1.5 3.1 4.8 6.6 8.5





2.5 95.6 96.0 96.4 96.8 97.2 97.7
3.0 91.5 92.2 93.0 93.8 94.6 95.4
3.5 87.5 88.6 89.7 90.8 92.0 93.2
4.0 83.8 85.1 86.5 88.0 89.5 91.1
4.5 80.2 81.8 83.5 85.3 87.1 89.0
5.0 76.8 78.7 80.6 82.6 84.8 87.0
5.5 73.6 75.7 77.8 80.1 82.5 85.1
6.0 70.6 72.8 75.2 77.7 80.3 83.2increase would be just ¥1.2 trillion for the first year, and its cumulative increase
would be ¥6.4 trillion after five years.
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VI. Practical Validity of Outright Purchase of Long-Term
Government Bonds
Based on the simulation results in the previous chapter, this chapter examines the
practical validity of two views of outright purchase of long-term government bonds. 
A. Evaluation of Two Views on the Outright Purchase of Long-Term
Government Bonds
We first summarize our evaluation with respect to the two policy options: the mild or
aggressive outright purchase of long-term government bonds.
In our evaluation, we took account of several factors such as (1) the impact of a
deflationary shock on the economy; (2) effects and risks stemming from the outright
purchase of long-term government bonds; (3) comparison of the policy effects with
those of the “built-in stabilizer” policy duration effects under the zero interest rate
policy; and (4) a possibility that desirable policy measures might be appropriately
chosen according to the nature of the shock.
For example, in the case of (4) above, if a deflationary shock is occasioned by the
misalignment of foreign exchange rates, it would be natural to consider purchasing
the U.S. dollar rather than long-term government bonds. In addition, depending on
the cause of a deflationary shock, it might be possible to aim at further monetary 
easing by increasing the variety of monetary operations under the zero interest rate
policy. As was the case in autumn 1998, if intensifying concern over market liquidity
brings about a deflationary impact on the economy, nominal interest rates on
medium- to long-term government bonds will decline through a “flight to quality.”
This may lead to widening spreads between yields on government bonds and those
on corporate bonds and commercial paper (CP). In such a case, the central bank
might, by implementing CP and corporate bond operations, consider implementing
monetary easing effects through guaranteeing liquidity to the financial system 
without incurring credit risk itself.
In the following, we discuss issues pertaining to the outright purchase of 
long-term government bonds from the viewpoints of (1)–(3) above.
1. Evaluation of mild operations
First of all, in order to contain the BOJ’s capital loss within its “reserve for possible
losses on securities transactions,” the size of mild outright purchases of long-term
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39. Assumptions regarding the simplified BOJ’s balance sheet as of March 1999 are as follows:
•Monetary base: Monetary base is ¥60 trillion, and is approximately divided into (1) ¥30 trillion of outright 
purchase of long-term government bonds; and (2) other financial assets, such as short-term government 
securities, and bills.
•Redemption of long-term government bonds: One-ninth of outstanding amounts of long-term government
bonds are redeemed every year (the BOJ’s outright purchase of long-term government bonds is limited to those
for which one year has passed since their issuance).
•Short-term interest rates: 3.5 percent (long-term interest rates are assumed to be 5 percent).government bonds becomes limited. Assuming a total operation of about
¥10 trillion, this is some 3 percent of the medium- to long-term government bonds 
outstanding amounting to ¥293 trillion as of end-1999. Put metaphorically, if one
thinks of the impact on apple prices of buying 10 apples out of 300, a substantial
impact cannot be expected.
Suppose the central bank implements such an operation when the economy is
stagnant and price changes have been slightly negative. There is considerable risk that
the term premium will rise reflecting concern over erosion of fiscal discipline as well
as extreme uncertainty regarding impacts of quantitative easing if one compares the
size of the operation with that of the government bond market.
Under such circumstances, it is quite possible to expect that policy duration
effects of the zero interest rate policy would be strengthened to restrain the pressure
on the long-term interest rates to rise. It is deemed more practical to contain the zero
interest rate policy to support the autonomous recovery of economic activities, when
demand for funds will expand reflecting the autonomous recovery of economic 
activities. Moreover, when the economy is faced with a massive deflationary shock,
the effectiveness of the mild outright purchase operation of long-term government
bonds is highly questionable, considering the insignificant effects of portfolio 
rebalancing in the foreign exchange market interventions. 
2. Evaluation of aggressive operations
With respect to a central bank’s commitment to the aggressive outright purchase of
long-term government bonds, it is out of the question to make such a commitment
suddenly in a situation where the economy is sluggish and the consumer price index
(CPI) has been exhibiting a small negative growth rate. This is because such a 
commitment would be accompanied by the real risk of pushing up the term pre-
mium. However, suppose the economy faces a rapid economic downturn provoking 
concerns of the economy tumbling into a deflationary spiral as witnessed during the
Great Depression. Then the central bank’s commitment to the aggressive outright
purchase of long-term government bonds would be regarded as the proper response
of the central bank pursuing its mandate of price stability and thus the risk of a sharp
rise in term premium would be less. Under such circumstances, the public and the
market would be more tolerant of the central bank daring to take a measure that 
carries risk and has uncertain effects.
Some advocates insist that if the outright purchase of long-term government
bonds is implemented within both a limited period and amount, it would not erode
fiscal discipline and thus would not be problematic. However, taking into account
the signaling effect with respect to future monetary policy, the limitation referred to
above would substantially offset the effect. In such a case, it would become necessary
for the BOJ to make clear, in order to send a strong signal to the market, that it will
implement massive operations and is prepared to incur a capital loss. Thus, it is 
necessary for the BOJ to explicitly examine with the fiscal authority how to handle
the expected capital loss, and clarify the responses, as Goodfriend (2000) discusses 
in the U.S. context. 
If one considers the aggressive outright purchase of long-term government bonds
as a last-resort operation in an emergency economic situation, it becomes necessary
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Therefore, if the BOJ decides to implement the mild outright purchase of long-term
government bonds (as an experimental operation) at a stage when the economy is
somewhat stagnant and year-on-year price changes have been slightly negative, such
an operation becomes the normal state and lessens the impact on expectations.
Bearing this point in mind, we believe it inappropriate to easily implement the mild
outright purchase of long-term government bonds.
B. Fiscal Burden of Outright Purchase of Long-Term Government Bonds
As discussed, the massive outright purchase of long-term government bonds will, even
if successful in rescuing the economy from a deflationary shock, likely result in the 
central bank incurring a capital loss and lead to an increase in private-sector holding of
government debt. In such a case, a view separating fiscal and monetary policy, such as
“given the government debt situation, fiscal policy has reached its limit, therefore,
when the economy deteriorates or (as some argue) it is below the potential growth rate,
monetary policy should step in to take risks and decide on further monetary easing,”
would not be relevant. In this case, if the government tries to avoid the additional 
fiscal burden, monetary policy would fail to absorb the excess monetary base after the
economic recovery, thus leading the BOJ to lose its control over inflation.
If the market believes that such a scenario is most likely, then the massive outright
purchase of long-term government bonds will be received as virtually equivalent to
the central bank’s underwriting of government bonds leading to the erosion of fiscal
discipline. In this case, there are risks that, due to a rise in inflation expectations and
also in the term premium stemming from increased uncertainty over its extent, 
long-term interest rates might increase more rapidly than expected inflation, thereby
making fiscal consolidation all the more difficult.
As such, in the special circumstances where interest rates are virtually zero percent
while a huge amount of government debt exists, a proposal asking for “additional
monetary easing since fiscal policy has reached its limit” boils down to asking, sooner
or later, that an additional fiscal burden be borne under the zero interest rate policy.
In other words, it is highly likely that, instead of an orthodox function of monetary
policy which emphasizes the provision of macro liquidity, a channel through which
the function of fiscal policy affects the economy will become the policy option 
(monetary policy turns into fiscal policy). 
If one also takes into account monetary transfer by a central bank, as a part of 
fiscal policy, in considering monetary easing, it can be argued that one should 
compare a central bank’s direct lending to the corporate sector—such as lending 
to firms (or via a private bank as an agent) or to government-affiliated financial 
institutions—with the cost and effects of the mild outright purchase of long-term
government bonds, the effects of which are extremely uncertain. Needless to say, if a
central bank’s direct lending to the private sector means allocating funds that the
BOJ ought to pay to the national treasury (which ultimately belong to the public) to
firms as subsidies, it would be quite an unusual move for a central bank.
In addition, if the fiscal authority becomes able to effect funding at quite a low
interest rate as a result of the central bank’s additional monetary easing under the zero
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there might be a side effect that the authority assumes an optimistic funding plan for
its debt. If an improvement in the fiscal imbalance has been hampered by difficulties
in reducing fiscal expenditure under such an optimistic funding plan (for example, a
case where additional fiscal expenditure becomes a vested interest or where surveil-
lance on the efficiency of fiscal expenditure loosens due to expectations of prolonged
low interest rates), market concerns over fiscal prospects might induce a rise in risk
premium attaching to nominal long-term interest rates, gradually making it difficult
to issue additional government bonds.
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If, by any chance, the issuance of government bonds comes to a halt, then, 
contrary to what Iwata (2000a) had expected, a situation materializes in which, due
to the budget constraints of a unified government (central bank plus government),
the fiscal deficit is eventually financed through the central bank increasing the money
supply—the so-called unpleasant monetarist arithmetic (Sargent and Wallace
[1981]). “Unpleasant monetarist arithmetic” in this context means that, even if 
independence is attached to a central bank institutionally by defining price stability
as its mandate, if fiscal policy lacks discipline for any reason, independence will not
guarantee a free hand in monetary policy with respect to price stability.
In this context, it is important to seek ways to ensure fiscal policy flexibility in
normal times. Specifically, taking into account that there is an increasing portion of
government expenditure which it is difficult to reduce, such as social security-related
expenditure, it might be necessary to devise other ways of expenditure through the
budget system. In this regard, it is quite a suggestive experience that U.S. budget
enforcement laws stipulate two principles: (1) instituting an upper limit on discre-
tionary spending items such as defense; and (2) adopting a “pay-as-you-go” principle
that mandates either cuts in entitlements or tax hikes whenever a policy change
results in net budget shortfalls. When these principles cannot be kept, an expenditure
reduction across the board is ordered, thereby adding constraints to the budget 
formulation process of the Congress, and this in fact has resulted in contributing to a
reduction in the U.S. fiscal deficit (Tomita [1999]).
VII. Styles of Monetary Policy Management
Taking into account the various ideas regarding monetary operations of the BOJ
under the zero interest rate policy, here we will examine the future framework for
implementing monetary policy in Japan, focusing on “style.”
A. Styles of Monetary Policy
While we have touched on inflation targeting in previous chapters, here we will 
elaborate upon it in detail. Inflation targeting is not a general approach for all 
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40. Such a situation might be triggered by a temporary deterioration in supply and demand conditions in the 
government bond market. If such a situation suggests a huge capital loss on long-term government bonds on the
part of private financial institutions and might threaten financial system stability, it becomes an issue that a 
central bank cannot neglect.monetary authorities. For example, neither the Fed nor European Central Bank
(ECB) has introduced it even though the ECB defines price stability as price index
growth,
41 and the Fed reports the views of the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) to Congress.
Considering the actual monetary policy framework in the United States and
Europe, the concern is how to establish a framework under which the monetary
authorities can appropriately convey their intention regarding monetary policy to
market participants, given the speed of information transmission and capital 
outflows/inflows in global financial markets. Thus, the question turns to what kind
of approach exists other than inflation targeting.
Padoa-Schioppa (1996) pointed out that monetary policy focus has shifted to
methods of implementation and dissemination of information necessary to better
enable central banks to pursue price stability, which has been widely regarded as a
mandate for central banks based on the experience of the 1970s. These methods 
are divided according to “styles.” In this context, styles are behavioral patterns that
central banks may adopt in various situations and are a much broader concept than
policy rules as suggested by some economists. Styles can be divided into two types:
(1) a commitment for a period of time to a single numerical target such as the foreign
exchange rate, money supply, or inflation; and (2) the “classical” acquisition of 
confidence by conducting monetary policy based on an overall consideration without
prior commitment to a specific target.
B. Practical Choice of a Style
It is not feasible for Japan to make a commitment to the foreign exchange rate,
although Mundel (2000) suggested doing so. In particular, it is difficult to strengthen
linkage of the yen and a currency basket comprising the U.S. dollar and euro and 
to further suppose a fixed exchange rate system in the long run. Nor it is easy 
to introduce monetary targeting, once adopted successfully in Switzerland and
Germany, considering the unstable empirical relationship between money demand
and the real economy in Japan. 
In addition, there are various views of inflation targeting, which has recently
received much attention. For example, the operational style of inflation targeting
adopted in each country varies. In the United Kingdom, the government decides a
concrete chart; in Sweden, the central bank sets it; in New Zealand and Canada, the
government and central bank cooperate. The objective of targeting also differs from
specifying a chart (in the United Kingdom) to setting a range (other countries).
Furthermore, accountability varies.
The big difference between the classical “discretion” style and inflation targeting,
in appearance, is commitment to a concrete target of inflation. Other merits of 
inflation targeting such as assurance of the independence of monetary policy’s 
operational objectives, transparency of policy management, and accountability are
achievable under other frameworks in light of the experience in the United States.
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41. The ECB defines price stability to be maintained over the medium term as “the situation where growth in the
consumer price index (HICI) is below 2 percent.”Central banks, which may influence market expectations, enhance their credibility by
positively conveying information regarding policy objectives, securing transparency
and accountability, achieving objectives, and being consistent in terms of the policy.
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For example, in a speech in September 1997, Federal Reserve Board Chairman
Alan Greenspan said that the conduct of monetary policy might naturally be discre-
tionary in circumstances where economic restructuring has been drastically effected
(Greenspan [1997]). We cannot forecast economic change precisely if we just apply
the historical relationships among various economic factors, because they have been
altered as a consequence of structural change. In pursuing the policy objective of 
sustainable growth by maintaining price stability, it is not sufficient to follow any one
mechanical rule based on previous relationships. Ad hoc or discretionary policy based
on tentative decisions without any coherent criteria is problematic because it is 
vulnerable to political pressure.
C. Framework for Discussion on the Choice of Style of Monetary Policy
In light of the above, just as there are various types of inflation targeting, style based
on an overall consideration may also take various forms. In other words, each central
bank has been pursuing a “trial and error” approach to finding a desirable “style” that
is in accordance with economic and social change. The concern of central banks is to
acquire credibility by enhancing transparency and accountability and to further
improve the situation by conducting flexible monetary policy rather than to find
answers as to which style should be adopted. 
From this viewpoint, the question as to what is a desirable style for the BOJ’s
monetary policy does not boil down to a question of whether inflation targeting
should be adopted or not. In fact, Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) showed that 
inflation targeting is a “constrained discretion” somewhere in the middle of two
extreme approaches, “strict rule” and “pure discretion.” Kuttner and Posen (1999)
stated that “adoption of inflation targeting constitutes a test of whether central bank
communication can substitute for strict and simple rules,” thus concluding that the
difference of the interpretation in adopting monetary policy is ideological for central
bankers, similar to the argument between rules-versus-discretion.
In this context, if the BOJ presently tries to establish a framework for implement-
ing monetary policy by restricting discretion under open independence, it would be
based on the same premise for adopting inflation targeting. It is also important for
the BOJ to establish a stable relationship with market participants and the public by
developing and improving its own style appropriate to the economic situation and
Japan’s central banking system. 
On October 13, 2000, the BOJ published a report entitled “On Price Stability”
(BOJ [2000]) that defines price stability as “an environment where economic agents
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42. In this regard, we should also note the idea that while publication of all information regarding monetary policy 
is not undesirable, enhancing the transparency of economic policy by conveying information is needed. For
example, Noyer (2000) stated, in reply to criticism that the ECB lacks policy transparency, that “It is [therefore]
important to judge carefully the contribution which the various elements of communication can make to the 
fulfillment of the primary objective of monetary policy.” He also pointed out that “publishing forecasts might
finally increase uncertainty and even complicate the maintenance of price stability,” since economic forecasts
should be evaluated appropriately in consideration of internal risks and uncertainty under structural reform. including households and firms can make decisions regarding such economic activity
as consumption and investment without being concerned about the fluctuation of
the general price level.” This report summarizes the discussion among the Policy
Board members on the issues related to price stability and concluded as follows:
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(1) In view of the current movement of prices in Japan, an inflation rate that is
consistent with the sound development of the economy is likely to be lower in
the short term than in the long term. 
(2) If some numerical values are adopted as the definition of price stability, they
are expected to be valid for a very long period of time. In view of the current
development of prices in Japan, it is difficult to set specific numerical values
to the definition of price stability that are consistent with the sound devel-
opment of the economy. Furthermore, even if some numerical values were
announced, they would not serve as a reliable guidepost in the conduct of
monetary policy, and the exercise would not likely contribute to enhancing
transparency of the conduct of monetary policy. Therefore, it is not deemed
appropriate to define price stability by numerical values. 
(3) While paying due attention to changes in the economy, the BOJ will 
nevertheless continue to explore whether price stability can be expressed by
some numerical values. 
It is necessary for the BOJ to bear in mind that a sustainable “style” that continues
for a long time and temporary “operations” in an emergency situation, such as the
zero interest rate policy, differ. In fact, Woodford (1999) pointed out that when a
temporary emergency measure is compared with a policy rule to which a central bank
can commit itself for a long period, the former is accompanied by a serious time
inconsistency problem and thus cannot affect economic entities’ expectations.
Therefore, he argued that a monetary policy tool under zero inflation should be a
part of a policy framework to which the BOJ can commit itself for a long period.
VIII. Conclusions
This paper has explained the basic framework of monetary policy under the zero 
interest rate policy. In addition, it has examined such crucial issues as (1) what options
beyond the zero interest rate policy would be available in response to deterioration in
the economic situation; (2) what would be the potential risks associated with these 
policy options; and (3) how these risks might change under a variety of economic 
conditions. On the basis of these analyses, we have emphasized the importance of
establishing modalities for effective monetary policy, with due consideration given to
actual conditions.
We argue that further monetary easing beyond the zero interest rate policy, most
typified by the outright purchase of long-term government bonds, should be viewed
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43. Based on the report titled “On Price Stability,” the BOJ decided to issue “Outlook and Risk Assessment of the
Economy and Prices.” The first report was issued on October 31, 2000. “Outlook and Risk Assessment of the
Economy and Prices” includes the forecasts of Policy Board members on real GDP, domestic wholesale price
index (WPI), and CPI (excluding perishables). as a bet which we would only be forced to explore in the event the Japanese economy
stands on the brink of serious deflation. Considering the uncertainty and risks 
surrounding these unconventional measures, it is quite inappropriate to introduce
them merely on an experimental basis. Of course, this does not mean that further
monetary easing may not be warranted in any circumstances, nor that other easing
measures not covered in this paper are infeasible. If other means of further easing
turn out to be available, we should not spare any effort to study them.
With regard to monetary policy in Japan, there seems to be some oversimplified
idea that the adoption of inflation targeting would be a panacea for current economic
difficulties. This should remind central bankers, who must make policy decisions on
a real-time basis amid drastic structural transformation, of the unfruitful traditional
“rule versus discretion” debate in terms of monetary policy implementation. It also
leads us to the well-known criticism presented by McCallum (1995).
With this in mind, we can say that the search for desirable modalities for monetary
policy is not necessarily tantamount to making a decision about inflation targeting. If
the present policy framework adopted by the BOJ has an orientation toward attaining
an optimal blend between a strictly rule-based approach and unconstrained discretion,
the eventual modalities can be said to have some commonalities with inflation target-
ing. In other words, the proper sequence we should follow is to start from a particular
modality for monetary policy, enhance its transparency and accountability, secure
external credibility, and conduct monetary policy in a flexible manner. This process is
self-reinforcing in the sense that it will bolster the credibility of monetary policy. 
During the course of prolonged economic stagnation, it is becoming clearer 
in Japan that monetary policy is neither a cure-all for an economic slump nor a 
substitute for policy measures directed at latent structural problems on the supply
side (see Yamaguchi [1999] and Shirakawa [2000] for more details). In a similar vein,
Dr. Issing of the ECB has made it clear (Issing [1999]) that unemployment is the
most pressing structural problem facing Europe, and that a continuing decline in 
the jobless rate can only be achieved through structural adjustment which might
cause pain to some vested interests. In light of this, we presume that the division of
roles between monetary policy and structural policy is also an issue to be addressed
by the BOJ.
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THE EFFECTS OF THE OUTRIGHT PURCHASE OF
LONG-TERM GOVERNMENT BONDS
In this Appendix, we explain how the outright purchase of long-term government
bonds stimulates the economy based on Goodfriend (2000).
Goodfriend (2000) assumes that, for a given consumption amount, money is used
to facilitate the exchange and reduce the time needed for the transaction. He calls
“narrow liquidity services” those provided by the medium of exchange allowing the
public to economize on “shopping time” in transactions. He also assumes that the
time saved through the additional holding of money will diminish as the amount of
money held increases and finally becomes zero. 
The money demand model assumed here is the Shopping Time Model in
McCallum and Goodfriend (1988). In an economy, one unit of goods is produced 
by using capital stock and labor. The goods can either be spent or used for 
production as investment goods. Households will allocate time among leisure 
transactions to obtain goods to consume, and production, and in every period select
a combination of production, consumption, investment, real money balance, and
short-term bondholding balance, so as to maximize the discounted present value of
utility obtained in each period from consumption and leisure. The optimal money
demand function for households is a complex function dependent on the future
inflation rate, short-term interest rates, past capital stock, and money demand 
balance. However, if one transforms the household money demand function by 
using the relationship at the equilibrium, one can obtain a relationship in which the
money demand balance of each period only depends on the corresponding period’s
consumption and nominal short-term interest rates, similar to the relationship of the
money demand function in the portfolio rebalancing model.
In this model, if nominal short-term interest rates decline to zero and a central
bank increased money supply and exchanged it for short-term government bonds, 
a mechanism—in which time needed for consumption is reduced due to an increase
in money thus resulting in increases in production—no longer works. In other
words, when interest rates on short-term financial assets become virtually zero, 
“an expansionary open market operation cannot relax the transaction constraint 
any further to free shopping time for more productive uses. At that point the 
economy may be said to be satiated in narrow liquidity services provided by the
medium of exchange.” 
On the other hand, he defines “liquidity broadly as a service yield provided 
by assets according to how easily they can be turned into cash, either by sale or by
serving as collateral for external financing.” Therefore, liquidity services defined
broadly are used to reduce exposure against what Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1995)
called the “external finance premium.” As explained in the following, in Goodfriend
(2000), liquidity services defined broadly at the core of a mechanism through which
a quantitative monetary easing policy can have some effect even when nominal 
short-term interest rates are zero.
Furthermore, Goodfriend (2000) assumed that the operational target for 
short-term term interest rates does not change, and considered the effects of the 
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the economy was hit by a new aggregate demand shock. In such a case, he regards the 
outright purchase of long-term government bonds as a policy measure working on
liquidity services defined broadly, with the effects spreading to the real economy
through (1) the portfolio rebalancing channel, and (2) the credit channel. As regards
the portfolio rebalancing channel, consider the following story.
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When a central bank buys less liquid assets (those include the long-term 
government bond) with money at zero nominal interest rate, the marginal broad 
liquidity services yield falls. The public then wishes to rebalance its portfolio by
attempting to sell money for less liquid assets. Since the public cannot rid itself of the
excess money balances, the result is that the prices of less liquid assets rise. The rise in
the prices of less liquid assets restores asset market equilibrium by (1) lowering the
expected future appreciation of less liquid assets, and (2) lowering the return in utility,
interest, or liquidity services as a percent of the prices of less liquid assets. 
When asset prices recover, households will consume more out of current income.
At the same time, if asset prices rise and Tobin’s q sufficiently rises, investment 
will recover. A decline in the savings ratio and increase in investment will have 
some effect in preventing income, consumption, and employment from declining.
Furthermore, increases in the marginal profit on real and organizational capital and
in corporate profits as well as a decline in the marginal utility of consumption will
further increase asset prices.
If one focuses on the point that long-term government bonds have high cash 
convertibility as well as high liquidity, some might question whether liquidity services
defined broadly increase by converting long-term government bonds into monetary
base. However, when the yield on long-term government bonds sufficiently declines
under the zero interest rate policy, the risk of incurring a capital loss due to a future
interest rate rise will increase relatively, and the possibility of converting into cash
without a collateral asset value loss or capital loss declines. Therefore, if long-term
government bonds are exchanged for monetary base, liquidity services defined
broadly will increase more than in normal times.
Next, we consider the credit channel, which Bernanke and Gertler (1995) empha-
sized. Here the purchase of long-term government bonds will reduce the external
finance premium through an increase in more liquid financial assets and a rise in
asset prices, enabling monetary easing effects to permeate. If the external finance 
premium declines as collateral value is restored, net assets and bank capital increase,
resulting in the credit spread shrinking and bank lending recovering. Since borrowing
cost, which depends on future income, declines, expenditure will increase. And if
expenditure increases, the multiplier effect will materialize with respect to current
income, thereby perhaps accelerating investment.
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